

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 AID-05 DHA-02 NSC-05 SP-02  
SS-15 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 PRS-01 ACDA-07 MC-02  
IO-13 IGA-02 TRSE-00 COME-00 EB-07 L-03 H-01  
PA-01 OMB-01 MCT-01 /090 W  
-----079494 160018Z /20

R 152200Z JUL 77  
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5530  
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA//  
JCS WASHDC//J-5, WHEM//  
CNO WASHDC  
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS CZ//SCSA//  
DIA WASHDC//ADM MSG FOR AH-7//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 PORT AU PRINCE 2546

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS, HA  
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF FY 1979 U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
FOR HAITI

REF: STATE 133136

1. SUMMARY. OUR MODEST AND CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR HAITI SERVES A VARIETY OF SPECIFIC U.S. INTERESTS AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED. CONGRESS HAS RESTRICTED PROGRAM ESSENTIALLY TO AIR/SEA RESCUE TRAINING AND SUPPORTIVE FMS EQUIPMENT; IN ADDITION, THERE IS A SMALL FMS CASH PROGRAM FOR NON-

SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS AND IMET SUPPORTS A SMALL PROGRAM OF PROFESSIONAL

MANAGEMENT TRAINING. GOH UNDERSTANDS RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAM IS CLOSELY RELATED TO U.S. ASSESSMENT OF IMPROVED HAITIAN PERFORMANCE IN MANY AREAS INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS.

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SMALL AS PROGRAM IS, IT PROVIDES US WITH BETTER ACCESS TO AND INFLUENCE WITH THE POLITICALLY IMPORTANT MILITARY LEADERSHIP, ENHANCES HAITI'S CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT SEARCH AND RESCUE RESPONSIBILITIES, IMPROVES NAVIGATION FACILITIES, AND TENDS TO MAKE THE GOH GENERALLY MORE RESPONSIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS. THE PROGRAM CAREFULLY EXCLUDES ANYTHING THAT WOULD ENHANCE HAITIAN CAPACITY TO ENGAGE IN DOMESTIC REPRESSION OR MILITARY

ADVENTURES AND IN NO WAY CONTRIBUTES TO ARMS TRANSFERS. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT THE PROGRAM CONTINUE AND EVEN BE EXPANDED SO LONG AS GOH MAKES EFFECTIVE USE OF PROGRAM, FOLLOWS RESPONSIBLE MILITARY POLICIES, AND CONTINUES TO IMPROVE IN HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. THERE FOLLOWS AN ASSESSMENT OF OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR HAITI KEYED TO THE QUESTIONS IN REFTEL. END SUMMARY.

2. U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES. (3)(A) PRINCIPAL U.S. INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN HAITI ARE DEVELOPING A CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE ON THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY OF HAITI AND, THROUGH THEM, REINFORCING U.S. INFLUENCE ON THE GOH. WITHIN THIS GENERAL GOAL, OUR SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES ARE TO IMPROVE THE PROFESSIONAL QUALITY OF THE HAITIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP AS OPPOSED THE THE MILITIA AND OTHER IRREGULAR FORCES, AND TO ENCOURAGE THE MILITARY TO PLAY A MORE USEFUL ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI. (B) ALTHOUGH THE DUVALIERS HAVE PRACTICED A FORM OF DIVIDE AND RULE, ENCOURAGING RIVAL MILITARY AND PARA MILITARY FORCES, THE MILITARY REMAIN A DOMINANT FORCE IN HAITIAN SOCIETY. THE MILITARY WOULD EXERT A DECISIVE INFLUENCE IN THE EVENT OF ANY UNEXPECTED CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT. THEY CAN AND DO INFLUENCE THE PACE OF CHANGE IN THE COUNTRY. THAT INFLUENCE IS LARGELY LOYALIST, CONSERVATIVE, AND SOMEWHAT SUSPICIOUS OF THE U.S. (C) CAREFULLY LIMITED BY CONGRESS, OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
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PROGRAM IN HAITI IS RESTRICTED ESSENTIALLY TO ENHANCE THE HAITIAN CAPACITY FOR SEA/AIR RESCUE THROUGH PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND LIMITED MODERNIZATION OF RELATED COMMUNICATIONS AND NAVIGATIONAL AIDS. BY DESIGN, THIS PROGRAM HAS NO INTERNAL SECURITY OR PARA MILITARY RELEVANCE. THIS PROGRAM HAS SOME RELEVANCE TO CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. THE U.S. ALSO SUPPORTS A VERY SMALL PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM.

3. PRESENT AND FUTURE THREAT ASSESSMENT. (4A)(A) ALTHOUGH THE GOH FACES NO PRESENT THREAT OR ACTIVE INSURGENCY, IT FEARS TWO POTENTIAL THREATS: A CLANDESTINE ARMED STRIKE AT THE LEADERSHIP -- PRINCIPALLY SUPPORTED BY EXILES -- TO BRING ABOUT A COUP D'ETAT; AND AN OUTRIGHT INVASION BY CUBAN OR CUBAN-SUPPORTED FORCES AND/OR HAITIAN EXILES. DESPITE A HISTORY OF UNEASY RELATIONS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IS NOT VIEWED AS A THREAT, AT LEAST FOR AS LONG AS BALAGUER-STYLE RULE CONTINUES. (B) THE GOVERNMENT DEALS WITH THESE POTENTIAL THREATS BY RIGID SECURITY MEASURES, INCLUDING A VAST NETWORK OF INFORMERS. PERSONS SUSPECTED OF WORKING TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT BY FORCE DISAPPEAR INTO PRISON INDEFINITELY. HAITIAN

GOVERNMENT AGENTS ABROAD KEEP THE GOVERNMENT INFORMED ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE OVERSEAS COMMUNITY AND HAITIANS RETURNING TO THE COUNTRY AFTER EXTENDED RESIDENCE ABROAD ARE OFTEN THOROUGHLY INTERROGATED AND INVESTIGATED BEFORE BEING ALLOWED TO REINTEGRATE INTO THE SOCIETY.

(C) HAITI HAS NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND TENDS TO VIEW OTHER LEFT-LEANING NEIGHBORS, SUCH AS JAMAICA UNDER MANLEY, WITH GREAT SUSPICION. THE GOH LOOKS ON ITSELF AS AN ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES, AS A SMALL NEIGHBOR WARRANTING SPECIAL PROTECTION FROM COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND IT REMAINS APPREHENSIVE THAT THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY PRINCIPLES OF THE RIO TREATY COULD NOT BE INVOKED QUICKLY IN THE EVENT OF A CUBAN-BACKED INCURSION NOT SUBJECT TO READY IDENTIFICATION AS AGGRESSION OR ARMED ATTACK.  
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(D) THE GOH'S COUNTER-GUERRILLA BATTALION AND THE INFANTRY BATTALION DO NOT HAVE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS BUT COULD PROBABLY REPEL OR CRUSH MINOR INSURGENCIES OR EXILE LANDINGS SUCH AS TOOK PLACE IN THE 1960'S. FOR MAJOR ATTACKS, THE GOH LOOKS TO THE U.S. FOR HELP.

(E) THE EMBASSY FEELS THAT THE GOVERNMENT EXAGGERATES THE THREATS IT FACES, PARTICULARLY THE CUBAN THREAT. ON THE OTHER HAND, ITS CONCERNS ABOUT THE THREAT FROM EMBITTERED EXILES ARE VALID. A PLOT TO ASSASSINATE THE PRESIDENT WAS DISCOVERED IN APRIL 1976 ONLY TWO DAYS BEFORE THE

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PA-01 OMB-01 MCT-01 /090 W  
-----079671 160018Z /20

R 152200Z JUL 77  
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5531  
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA//  
JCS WASHDC//J-5, WHEM//

CNO WASHDC  
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS CZ//SCSA//  
DIA WASHDC//ADM MSG FOR AH-7//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 PORT AU PRINCE 2546

ARMED PLOTTERS PLANNED TO STRIKE. IN MAY OF THIS YEAR A GROUP OF FOUR HAITIANS AND TWO AMERICANS WERE ARRESTED IN NEW JERSEY FOR COLLECTING ARMS AND PLOTTING ARMED ACTION AGAINST THE GOH.

4. JUSTIFICATION FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE ABSENCE OF CURRENT OR PROJECTED THREAT (4B)(A) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO HAITI IS PREDICATED ON BASIS OF OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS OUTLINED PARA TWO ABOVE AND IS NOT SPECIFICALLY LINKED TO PERCEIVED THREATS. NEVERTHELESS, OUR LIMITED SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DOES SERVE TO ASSURE THE GOH OF THE GENUINNESS OF OUR INTEREST IN HAITI, GIVES SUBSTANCE TO OUR EMPHASIS ON THE RIO TREATY AS HAITI'S ULTIMATE DEFENSE, AND DISCOURAGES IRRATIONAL URGES TO BUY EXCESSIVE QUANTITIES OF ARMS.

(B) IF HAITIAN-DOMINICAN RELATIONS DETERIORATE TO ANY MARKED DEGREE (THEY ARE CURRENTLY IMPROVING), IT WOULD AUGUR BADLY FOR THE PRESENT POSITIVE TREND TOWARD COLLABORATION ON MUTUAL CONFIDENTIAL

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SECURITY MATTERS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES THAT HAVE BEEN TRADITIONAL ENEMIES FOR MORE THAN A CENTURY. A RETURN TO AN ATTITUDE OF MUTUAL SUSPICION AND ACTIVE VITUPERATION WOULD MARKEDLY WEAKEN THEIR JOINT CAPACITY TO RESIST CUBAN SUBVERSION. IN OUR VIEW, A POLITICALLY UNSTABLE SITUATION OF THIS NATURE WOULD NOT GO UNEXPLOITED BY CUBA.

5. HOST GOVERNMENT PERCEPTION OF FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENT (4C). (A) HAITI BELIEVES THAT ITS MILITARY AS PRESENTLY CONFIGURED, A PROPORTIONATELY LARGE GROUND FORCE SUPPORTED BY A SMALL BUT MOBILE AIR FORCE AND NAVY, IS APPROPRIATE FOR THE PERCEIVED THREATS.

(B) THE GOH FEELS RELATIVELY CONFIDENT THAT ITS PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE CAN SUCCESSFULLY CONTAIN ANY INTERNAL SUBVERSION, BUT AS PRESENTLY EQUIPPED IT COULD NOT COPE WITH AN OUTRIGHT INVASION BY CUBAN OR CUBAN-SUPPORTED FORCES. THE FAD'H CONSEQUENTLY WOULD LIKE TO PROCURE U.S. COMBAT ARMS, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING OF A MORE AGGRESSIVE NATURE AND IN GREATER MAGNITUDE.

(C) WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE FAD'H IS APPROPRIATE AS IS. WE DO NOT AGREE WITH GOH EVALUATION OF THE CUBAN THREAT. CONSEQUENTLY, WE CONSIDER THAT AN ARMS BUILDUP, AS DESIRED BY THE FAD'H, IS UNNECESSARY AND WOULD

BE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY DESTABILIZING. THE RIO TREATY IN OUR VIEW PROVIDES ADEQUATE PROTECTION.

6. DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES PRIORITIES FOR HAITI. (4D)

(A) GOH WILL REQUEST U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE FOLLOWING PRIORITIZED GENERAL CATAGORIES:

- (1) SEA/AIR RESCUE TRAINING TO BE FINANCED THROUGH IMET.
  - (2) AIDS TO NAVIGATION AND NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT (E.G. BUOY TENDER, RESCUE TUG, MISCELLANEOUS TYPES OF BUOYS) THROUGH FMS CREDIT.
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(3) PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF OFFICER AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN MANAGEMENT, LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION, FINANCED THROUGH IMET.

(4) GROUND MOBILITY AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (TRUCKS, JEEPS AND RADIOS) THROUGH FMS CASH.

(5) INDIVIDUAL AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION (HAND GUNS, RIFLES, MACHINE GUNS AND ARTILLERY) THROUGH FMS CASH AND COMMERCIAL PURCHASE.

(B) FOR A MORE COMPLETE AND DETAILED PROJECTION SEE USDAO LETTER C-5-77, SUBJECT: MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTION (MSAP) FY 79-83, HAITI, DTD JAN 77; AND DSAA & DEPUTY ASST SEC (SECURITY ASSISTANCE) OASD/ISA LETTER, SUBJECT: FMS CREDIT WANT LIST FOR HAITI, DTG 011403Z APR 77). THESE TWO REFERENCES ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS CONCERNING PROJECTED PRIORITIES, TYPE OF FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS, INTENDED USE OF EACH ITEM, AND OVERALL U.S. INTEREST SERVED.

(C) THESE GOH PROJECTIONS ARE IN ACCORD WITH OUR INTEREST AS OUTLINED IN PARA TWO OF THIS MESSAGE AND THE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT PROCURED WILL BE USED AS INDICATED THEREIN.

(D) IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER LESS ADVANCED OR LESS COSTLY ALTERNATIVE OR SUBSTITUTE ITEMS OR SERVICES WOULD BE MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE AND MEET U.S. OBJECTIVES.

7. IMPACT OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON HAITIAN ECONOMY (4E).

MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN FY 1977 ACCOUNT FOR 8.7 PER CENT OF BUDGETED HAITIAN RESOURCES AND 4.7 PER CENT OF ALL BUDGETED RESOURCES. MOST OF THE MILITARY BUDGET IS USED FOR SALARIES AND MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND IS ESTIMATED AT \$150,000. NO PURCHASES OF SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS ARE EXPECTED. HAITIAN MILITARY BUDGETS ARE EXPECTED TO REMAIN SMALL AND HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY. (SEE PORT-AU-PRINCE 2158)

8. IMPACT OF USG OR CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL IN HOST COUNTRY (4F). THE NUMBER OF USG AND/OR CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL REQUIRED IN HAITI TO SUPPORT THE FMS-C PROGRAM

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IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME, BUT IT WILL BE MINIMAL. WE FORE-  
SEE NO PROBLEMS FROM ANY ADDED PRESENCE.

9. AVAILABILITY OF COMPARABLE DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICE  
FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, (4G). GOH HAS BEEN GRANTED AND/OR  
PURCHASED MILITARY TRAINING, NAVY RESCUE CRAFT AND EQUIPMENT,  
CONVENTIONAL AND ROTOR-WING AIRCRAFT, TRUCKS, JEEPS AND RADIO  
EQUIPMENT AND SMALL AMOUNTS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF UNSOPHISTICATED  
SMALL ARMS, ARMORED VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY. ALTHOUGH COMPARABLE  
ITEMS CAN BE PURCHASED ELSEWHERE, THE GOH FAVORS U.S. ARTICLES  
AND SERVICES ABOVE ALL OTHER SOURCES. IT HAS, HOWEVER, USED  
OTHER SOURCES IN THE PAST (E.G. ISRAEL), AND WOULD PROBABLY DO  
SO AGAIN IF REQUESTS ARE DENIED BY THE USG.

10. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT (4H). (A) HAITI'S SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS, AS A RESULT OF CONGRESSIONAL GUIDE-  
LINES, LIMITED IN FOCUS. PURCHASE OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY  
AND/OR WEAPONS PLATFORMS ARE STRICTLY PROHIBITED UNDER THE  
FMS CASH OR FMS CREDIT PROGRAMS. COMBAT TRAINING IS ALSO  
PROHIBITED UNDER IMETP.  
(B) THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S MILITARY FAR EXCEEDS THE FAD'H  
IN MODERN EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING.

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USCINCSO QUARRY HTS CZ//SCSA//  
DIA WASHDC//ADM MSG FOR AH-7//

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11. HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT (4I). THERE HAVE BEEN FEW SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, DURING THE LAST FOUR MONTHS. THE QUIET RELEASE OF 21 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN LATE FEBRUARY AND THE RECENT EMPHASIS ON ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ARE EVIDENCE OF SLOW BUT CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT. THE HAITIAN VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE U.S.-BACKED RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE JUNE OAS CONFERENCE IN GRENADA, HOWEVER, REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD BY HAITI AND MAY PRESAGE EVENTUAL WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A VISIT BY THE IAHR. SINCE THE RENEWAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO HAITI IN FY 1975 IN ITS NON-MILITARY FORM WAS CLEARLY LINKED TO IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, ITS CONTINUATION WOULD BE EXPECTED BY THE GOH SO LONG AS HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS ARE MADE. REDUCTION OR CANCELLATION RELATED TO A BACKWARD TREND IN HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE GOH BUT ONLY IF IT WERE CAREFULLY HANDLED. ABRUPT REDUCTIONS RELATED OR UNRELATED TO HUMAN RIGHTS TRENDS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE UNDERSTOOD AND COULD IMPACT UNFAVORABLY AND

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SIGNIFICANTLY ON ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE GOH.

12. ARMS POLICY (4J). HAITI IS NOT A SUPPLIER OF ARMS AND ITS PURCHASES ARE AT SUCH A LOW LEVEL THAT ITS BUYING HAS LITTLE EFFECT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER STATISTICS. MOREOVER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER WARMLY ENDORSED PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT ON ARMS TRANSFERS.

13. TRAINING RECOMMENDED FOR IMETP RECIPIENTS (4K).

(A) AS OUTLINED IN PARA TWO OF THIS MESSAGE, WE BELIEVE THAT IMET DOES SERVE SPECIFIC U.S. INTERESTS IN TERMS OF ENHANCING HAITI'S SEA/AIR RESCUE CAPABILITIES.

(B) THE IMETP-HAITI SHOULD BE CONTINUED TO COMPLEMENT SPECIFICALLY APPROVED ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

(C) WE DO NOT EXPECT THE GOH WILL PURCHASE ANY EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING UNDER FMS. HAITI'S PRACTICE HAS BEEN TO TURN TO COMMERCIAL SOURCES FOR THIS TYPE OF TRAINING AND WE EXPECT THIS PATTERN TO CONTINUE.

(D) DUE TO THE GOH'S LIMITED FINANCIAL RESOURCES WE WOULD NOT EXPECT IT TO PAY TRAVEL AND LIVING COSTS TO MAXIMIZE TRAINING AVAILABILITY UNDER IMETP.

14. SUMMARY STATEMENT BY CHARGE. FOURTEEN YEARS AGO OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND AID PROGRAMS IN HAITI WERE TERMINATED WHEN IT BECAME IMPOSSIBLE TO CONDUCT BUSINESS WITH THE REPRESSIVE REGIME OF DR. FRANCOIS DUVALIER.

BILATERAL RELATION FOR THE SEVERAL YEARS FOLLOWING REMAINED  
POOR AND WERE CHARACTERIZED BY MUTUAL SUSPICION. THE U.S.  
AND OTHER NATIONS WERE DISTRESSED BY THE EXCESSIS OF  
DR. DUVALIER'S GOVERNMENT. THE GOH WAS ANGERED BY ACTIVE  
U.S. INTERVENTIONISM AND THE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE  
ONGOING "BLACK REVOLUTION." IN THE LAST FEW YEARS OF HIS  
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LIFE DR. DUVALIER BEGAN TO FOCUS SOME ATTENTION ON HAITI'S  
RAVAGED ECONOMY AND INITIATED PROGRAMS WHICH WERE CONTINUED  
BY HIS SON JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER WHEN HE BECAME PRESIDENT IN  
1971. IN THE LITTLE MORE THAN SIX YEARS OF JEAN-CLAUDE  
DUVALIER'S PRESIDENCY, OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED  
STEADILY. DUVALIER HAS DEMONSTRATED DETERMINATION TO CONTROL  
AND REDUCE THE BRUTAL EXCESSES OF HIS FATHER'S REGIME,  
MOBILIZED DOMESTIC RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT, AND MODERNIZED  
THE GOVERNMENT. PROGRESS HAS BEEN SLOW BUT IT CONTINUES. AS  
DUVALIER TOOK ACTION ON MATTERS IMPORTANT TO THE U.S.,  
WE SIGNALLED ENCOURAGEMENT BY REINTRODUCING OUR AID PROGRAM  
IN FY 1972, INITIATING A MODEST MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM  
IN FY 1975, INITIATING A PL-480 TITLE I PROGRAM IN FY 1975,  
AND INITIATING A LIMITED FMS PROGRAM IN FY 1977. THE  
GOVERNMENT KNOWS WELL THAT EACH AUGMENTATION OF OUR PROGRAMS  
FOR HAITI REFLECTS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ON ITS PART AND THESE  
CAREFUL TACTICS PROVIDE THE U.S. WITH THE LEVERAGE NEEDED TO  
ENCOURAGE SENIOR LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO FOCUS ON HUMAN  
RIGHTS MATTERS, ESTABLISH MORE REALISTIC DEVELOPMENT GOALS,  
AND PROVIDE THE WORLD WITH A BETTER IMAGE OF TODAY'S HAITI.

I BELIEVE THAT THE TACTICS WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING WITH  
THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ARE SOUND AND HOPE THAT THEY  
WILL BE CONTINUED. WE DISCOURAGE ARMS TRANSFERS, CONCENTRATE ON  
MATTERS RELATED TO OVERALL U.S. OBJECTIVES, AND PROVIDE POSITIVE IN-  
CENTIVES TO IMPROVED GOH PERFORMANCE IN A NUMBER OF AREAS IMPORTANT  
TO US INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS.

15. THIS IS A JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE.  
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## Message Attributes

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